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ABSTRACT

The identifiably different rhetorical behaviors of Patrick Henry and James Madison, as expressed in their Virginia debates, reflect each man's philosophical view of human nature and the role of reason in human behavior. Patrick Henry, expressing the pessimism of Calvinistic tradition, believed that people are intrinsically evil with a dominant drive toward self-interest. Government, according to Henry, is likewise evil because it is composed of human elements; consequently, the concept of checks and balances is absurd. Liberty and power originate with the people as a natural and individual right. Patrick Henry's rhetoric is absolute and filled with either/or formulations that allow for little deliberation. On the other hand, Madison expressed a complex view of human nature that combined Calvinistic pessimism with Enlightenment optimism. Emphasizing the positive aspects of human nature, he stressed the amount of trust that is implied in civilized society. Representatives are the mouthpieces of the people, and governmental checks prevent the abuse of power. Government operates as a "neutral sovereign" where factional interests are subservient to the national interests. Madison's rhetoric is rational and reflects balance and moderation in the areas dealing with human liberty and choices. (MAI)

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Basic Assumptions in the Virginia Ratification Debates: Patrick Henry vs. James Madison on the Nature of Man and Reason

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Lois Einhorn is a doctoral student in Speech Communication at Indiana University. This study is based on her M.A. thesis completed at the Pennsylvania State University under the direction of Dr. Carroll C. Armold. The author wishes to thank also Dr. Robert Gunderson of Indiana University for his incisive criticisms.

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Basic Assumptions in the Virginia Ratification Debates: Patrick Henry vs. James Madison on the Nature of Man and Reason

Rhetorical and historical scholars have recognized that the speeches of Patrick Henry and James Madison in the Virginia Ratification Convention on the Federal Constitution contributed to the shaping of this nation.[1] Yet, despite its rhetorical significance, the speechmaking of these two leaders in this important public setting has been the subject of little scholarly investigation. The present study offers one perspective from which to view these speeches by examining the assumptions about the nature of man and the role of reason that were reflected in their rhetoric. The nature of man and the role of reason were significant categories of general philosophical concern in the eighteenth century, and the two conceptions lie at the roots of judgments on how to govern men. Because the two leaders' assumptions about man and reason were so different, and because their assumptions related to their rhetorical choices, it is possible through an explication of these differing assumptions to construct two conflicting rhetorical paradigms that explain, in part, how their rhetoric functioned.

Almost all of Henry's assumptions about the nature of man stemmed directly or indirectly from his belief that man was inherently evil. In his words, "Man is a fallen creature, a fallible being, and cannot be depended on without self-love."[2] Henry's "man" was evil largely because self-interest was his

dominant drive. According to the Antifederalist leader, this dominance of self-interest found political expression in an unsatiable thirst for power. Abuse of power was a natural consequence of man's nature. For Henry, it was beyond human nature for people to give up power voluntarily. "Human nature," he declared, "never will part from power. Look for an example of a voluntary relinquishment of power, from one end of the globe to another: you will find none."[3] Henry's pessimistic view of man was not unusual during the age in which he lived. A negative evaluation of man's nature was deeply embedded in the political consciousness of eighteenth-century America. The Calvinistic tradition had taught the depravity of man. The notion of original sin asserted man's inherent evil nature. Henry's exposure as a child to Great Awakening preachers such as Samuel Davies made him even more susceptible than Madison to the influence of this Calvinistic thinking.[4]

Henry's views on government were a natural extension of his views on man. As government was made up of men, and as men were inherently evil, Henry deduced that government would be evil as well. "That government," he said, "is no more than a choice among evils, is acknowledged by the most intelligent among mankind, and has been a standing maxim for ages."[5] In other words, to Henry, man's agencies could be no better than he was. It was impossible to get good government out of bad human parts. The assumed need for a system of checks and balances implied that governmental agencies would abuse power if not checked. Significantly, Henry and Madison never debated the need for checks and balances. The issue between them was, "What constitute sufficient checks?" In

Henry's mind, the checks provided by the proposed Constitution were not only insufficient but were imaginary. He declared, "There will be no checks, no real balances, in this government. What can avail your specious, imaginary balances, your rope-dancing, chain-rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contrivances?"[6] The only adequate check was one founded on self-interest. Henry flatly denied the Federalist argument that the power to reelect would serve as a check: "The only semblance of a check is the negative power of not reelecting them. This, sir, is but a feeble barrier, when their personal interest, their ambition and avarice, come to be put in contrast with the happiness of the people. All checks founded on anything but self-love will not avail."[7]

Henry's choice of language reflected his uneasiness about the ill consequences of an insufficiently checked government. Words expressing suspicion permeated his discourse, giving it an almost paranoic tone. In one 250 word sample, for instance, he used "uneasy" five times, "annihilation" twice, and "perilous," "delusive," "disquieted," "agitated," "extreme danger," "fearful jeopardy," and "fatal" one time each. Henry often used terms that expressed death such as "annihilation" and "fatal" in the above sample.[8]

An unchecked government, said Henry, would take away the people's liberty. This was a serious charge as liberty ranked at the top of his hierarchy of values. "Liberty," he proclaimed, "the greatest of all earthly blessings--give us that precious jewel, and you may take everything else!"[9] Adjectives that Henry used frequently in describing liberty included "sacred," "dear," "valuable," and "noble." Henry defined liberty as the absence of

governmental interference, "the freedom of [from] their government."[10] The reason that liberty and government were polar terms was that the proposed Constitution required that the people give up some of their liberty and power to a central government. This notion of "giving up" was crucial to Henry. Throughout the debates, he spoke of "giving up," "giving away," "throwing away," "abandoning," "relinquishing," "surrendering," and "parting with" rights. "We are giving power," he said; "they [the central government] are getting power. . . ."[11]

A basic premise of American thought in the eighteenth century was that there existed a sacred sphere of human rights that people possessed in a state of nature. Power originated with the people. Only they could delegate some of their sovereign rights and powers to government. In return for this power, government had the responsibility to protect the people's natural rights. In addition to being a natural right, liberty was an individual right, and Henry's style reflected his particular concern for the individual. The following exclamation typifies the way that he spoke with each audience member: "They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, every thing you eat, drink, and wear."[12] Henry's concern for the individual was reflected also in his frequent use of biological images. Words such as "body," "mind," "head," "hands," "pulse," "heart," "breast," "eyes," "souls," and "lungs" can be found throughout the written record.

Henry's concern for the individual related to his provincial nature. His choice of strategies was especially reflective of

his localism. Henry began the debates from a difficult argumentative position. The question put before the Ratification Convention differed from "typical" resolutions. Congress did not ask Virginia to discuss whether a change was necessary but whether the Constitution was the kind of change that was necessary. As a spokesman for the negative side, Henry's rhetoric needed not only to negate; it needed to present alternatives. Constructive argumentation was demanded, too, by the fact that the Constitution would go into effect among the ratifying states upon the ratification of nine states. By the time the Virginia Convention convened, eight states had ratified.[13] Yet, Henry's rhetoric showed no awareness of the fact that if one more state ratified, the Articles of Confederation would be rendered inoperative. His correspondence with Antifederalists in other states was limited; he said and did little to acknowledge that Virginia's actions could influence the decisions in the remaining states; and he failed to develop the details of what Virginia should do if the Federalists received the approval of the nine necessary states despite a negative vote from Virginia. Instead, Henry based his arguments on strong local pride and on the belief that liberty was the summa bona of political goods. Thirteen years before the Virginia Convention, the colonists had been successful in using the liberty argument to justify their break from Great Britain. By focusing on the themes of the Revolutionary era in the Ratification Convention, Henry may have been arguing a dying myth. The rhetoric of Revolutionary agitation was inadequate to meet the needs of political deliberation if the outcome of the Convention is used

to judge effectiveness.

Madison's "man" was a much more complex creature than Henry's. He was neither totally depraved nor totally virtuous. Rather, he had within himself varying amounts of goodness and badness. He was selfish and driven by passions in some respects and virtuous and driven by reason in others. Madison's "man" was a blend of Calvinistic pessimism and Enlightenment optimism. In the debates, Madison mixed pessimism and optimism, however, in unequal proportions. He stressed the positive aspects of man's nature, justifying his optimistic outlook by arguing that what was at issue was not whether man was totally virtuous but whether man possessed enough virtue to be trusted with limited power. In Madison's mind, this amount of trust was implied in civilized society: ". . . there must be some degree of confidence put in agents," he contended, "or else we must reject a state of civil society altogether."[14] Man's virtue, Madison maintained, would manifest itself in his choice of representatives.

Madison's "representative" performed a function different from Henry's. To Henry, representatives were to be mere mouthpieces of the people. Madison argued, however, that representatives had the responsibility to exercise independent judgment. They were to study all questions in the depth that every voter would if he had the time. Since the people would choose the best and most intelligent men to represent them, the independent decisions of these representatives probably would be wise ones. As the interests of the representatives would be the same as the interests of their constituents, the representatives would have no reason to

abuse their powers. They, too, had to live under the laws they made. Moreover, as representatives would be dependent on the people for their political existence, they could not be negligent of the people's interests. Abuse of power would mean that they would not be reelected.

If the checks that the people retained over the representatives were insufficient, governmental checks would prevent abuses of power. According to Madison, man could be (and needed to be) controlled through balanced government. It was essential to establish this control because a diversity of minds and talents was an inherent product of human nature and must produce a diversity and rivalry of interests in society. Today we call this diversity "pluralism"; Madison termed it "factionalism." The Federalist Paper Number Ten contains a definition of what Madison meant: "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or of the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."[15] Madison contended that within a popular government, the forces of faction were self-destructive if uncontrolled. This was the problem unsolved by a confederated form of government such as that which existed under the Articles of Confederation. Since the cause of factions (conflicting interests between groups) could not be removed without destroying liberty, the cure lay in controlling the effects. This, to Madison, was the function of government. A representative, republican government was the method that would enable a society

marked by factions to preserve its liberty. This method of controlling the self-destructive forces of factions was both radical and unique. The current theory of government insisted that a republican government could exist only over a relatively small area with a relatively small and homogeneous population. Madison, however, turned the theory upside down. He argued that a multiplicity of interests over a large area would act as a stabilizing factor. The greater number of factions combined with the greater size of the area would make communication between the groups difficult. Because of difficulty in communicating, the different factions would neutralize one another rather than join together to form a majority coalition.

Madison's method of neutralizing and balancing divisive factions affected his view of government. The relationship that he saw between individual factions (men and groups of men) and government was significantly different from the relationship that Henry saw. Whereas Henry's views on government were a simple extension of his views on man, Madison believed that a notion of transcendance would operate. Government would be a superstructure sufficiently energetic to contain divisive factions while allowing men to carry out essential public business. The different factional interests would be subservient to the national interest. By advancing this national interest, government would rise above the local, divisive interests of the factional groups. As an umpire, it would act dispassionately as a "neutral sovereign."[16] Thus, while Henry saw the proposed Federal Union as an "empire of men, and not of laws,"[17] Madison envisioned the reverse--"an empire of laws and not of men."

Madison's first concern was for the nation's interests and then for the individual's. Union rather than liberty formed the apex of his pyramid of values. Having launched his career during the Revolution, it is not surprising that Madison maintained that a strong Union would protect rather than usurp the liberty of the people and would secure rather than threaten the sovereignty of the states. The fifteen year age difference between Madison and Henry may account for the wider scope of Madison's vision.[18] Unlike Henry, Madison viewed the ratification issue as one contest rather than as thirteen separate ones. His constant communication with Federalist leaders in other states illustrated his awareness of the fact that Virginia's decision could affect the outcome in these other states.

In Henry's world there was little room for the application of reason because there were few areas of knowledge and decision-making in which men had to deliberate in order to choose. Henry presented himself as a man of absolutes. Although he never explained fully his criteria for judging Right and Wrong, Good and Bad, True and False, he did seem to believe that such criteria existed and were or ought to be obvious. His absolutism explains perhaps why it was incomprehensible to him that Governor Edmund Randolph changed his position concerning the proposed Constitution. "What alteration," Henry asked, "has a few months brought about? The eternal difference between right and wrong does not fluctuate. It is immutable."[19] An illustration of Henry's absolutism is his rejection of the theory of concurrent powers. It was outside the realm of possibilities in Henry's thinking for both the federal

government and the states to have such powers as those of taxation and the regulation of the militia. Either the federal government or the states had to possess the powers exclusively (or at least the powers of one had to be superior to those of the other).

Henry's style also showed a preference for the absolute. He frequently used what Kenneth Burke calls "god-terms" and "devil-terms."[20] "Liberty" and "freedom" were "god-terms"; "tyranny" and "monarchy" were "devil" ones. Henry also often used adjectives and adverbs that suggested extremes such as the following words taken from one short sample: "best," "extremely," "entire," "absolute," "every," "fully," "great," "highest," and "utmost."[21]

Henry's preference for the absolute relates to his preference for the explicit over the implied. He demanded that meanings be expressed fully leaving nothing to implication. Ambiguity and room for different interpretations were, to Henry, invitations for abuses of power. He argued, for example, that under the "sweeping clause," Congress might pass any law it chose under the pretense that it was "necessary and proper" in order to carry out some specified power. He saw the lack of a Bill of Rights as sure proof that the proposed government was a conspiracy to enslave the people. To the Federalist argument that the rights were secure because they were implied, Henry retorted, "Even say it is a natural implication,--why not give us a right . . . in express terms, in language that could not admit of evasions or subterfuges?"[22]

Henry's absolutism and his either-or formulations invited little real deliberation. He scorned reasoning, particularly deductive reasoning, as both too technical and too devious for use in political argument. "Poor people," he said, "do not understand

technical terms. Their rights ought to be secured in language of which they know the meaning."[23] With regard to religious liberty, Henry declared: "There is many a religious man who knows nothing of argumentative reasoning; . . . who cannot go through all the labyrinths of syllogistic, argumentative deductions, when they think that the rights of conscience are invaded. This sacred right ought not to depend on constructive, logical reasoning."[24]

What were Henry's criteria for making political decisions? He was not entirely clear here, but he gave the impression that a "good reason" was one that evoked a strong "feeling." At one point, he said, "It is a fact that the people do not wish to change their government. How am I to prove it? It will rest on my bare assertion, unless supported by an internal conviction in men's breasts."[25] "Internal conviction" made an individual argument a "good" one. This meant that each idea was to be judged <u>feelingly</u> and independently of others, and what most common people <u>felt</u> was the political test.

Madison's assumptions about the role of reason were quite different from Henry's. Many biographical sketches of Madison mention the balance and moderation that permeated his thinking. His Convention rhetoric supports this view. With regard to human nature, Madison maintained that man was neither all good nor all bad but possessed <u>both</u> good <u>and</u> bad qualities. As a rational being, man possessed the capacity to choose between right and wrong, good and bad. The purpose of government was to steer man's choices away from the bad side. If controlled in this fashion, man would <u>probably</u> (although not certainly) make wise choices.

To control man, Madison argued that government needed to achieve a balance between the extremes of anarchy and tyranny. He claimed that the system worked out in the Constitution achieved this balance in a unique way. Through the principle of concurrent powers, the proposed government could avoid the evils of absolute consolidation and absolute confederation. The very notion of concurrent powers, which Madison specially endorsed, suggested a denial of extremes. Madison saw the possibility of both the federal government and the states possessing certain powers simultaneously. He admitted that this unique form of government would not be a perfect system and wanted only that the system be better than the present one. He clearly endorsed the non-absolutist sentiment expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution--"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union. . . ." The words "more perfect" indicate that Madison did not envision the Constitution as forming a perfect Union, but only the best possible one given the state of human affairs. Madison maintained that probable workability and expediency should be the criteria for judgment in trying to form the best possible system of government. The question he asked in analyzing a policy was, "Will we gain more than we will lose?" Madison's reasons for supporting the power of taxation is typical. He argued that the power was "necessary," "practical," "safe," and "economical."[26]

Madison's way of arguing left much room for the application of reason. Not all types of reasoning, however, were equally worthy in his opinion. Logical reasoning, especially syllogistic reasoning, was by far the highest form. Words such as "reason," "syllogism," "deduction," "rationality," "proof," and "demonstration"

permeated his discourse. He not only claimed that syllogistic reasoning was the highest form of rational effort, but he "practiced what he preached." Usually he structured his message deductively, moving from the general to the specific. Madison respected and used deductive logic and he contended that the tests of this type of reasoning ought to be the criteria by which a decision to adopt or reject the Constitution should be made. Early in the Convention, in an attempt to counteract Henry, Madison retorted, "In this pursuit, we ought not to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but to those understandings and judgments which were selected by the people of this country, to decide this great question by a calm and rational investigation."[27] Later, he asked, "For what is the object of our discussion? Truth, sir. To draw a true and just conclusion. Can this be done without rational premises and syllogistic reasoning?"[28]

Madison's appeals to the rationality of the delegates must be recognized as appeals made during the Age of Reason. In the eighteenth century, appeals to reason could evoke especially favorable feelings: "His [Madison's] insistence upon a rational approach to the judgment of the question at hand identified him with the motives and the social order of the 'men of reason' who made up his audience. Obviously, para-logical, such identification probably appeals to the emotions of the hearer."[29]

The findings of the present study are consistent with the conclusions of other critics. Cecelia Kenyon has argued that the Antifederalists were "men of little faith" because they

possessed a negative opinion of man's nature.[30] Kenyon did not deal exclusively with Henry, but her conclusions about the Antifederalists in general are consistent with the findings reported here. The present study also supports Michael Kammen's implication in People of Paradox that the contradictory pull between liberty and government was the primary tension during the Revolution-Constitution period.[31] Finally, this study answers Norman Risjord's request for an exploration of ideological factors as one means of explaining the voting behavior in the Virginia Convention.[32] Accepting the contention that the assumptions of Henry and Madison concerning man and reason offer one explanation for the voting behavior does not negate the validity of other factors such as economic issues, sectional differences, and the presence or absence of extra-Virginia contact;[33] rather, these assumptions provide an additional perspective from which to view the Virginia debates.

The attitudes towards man and the nature of proof expressed by Henry and Madison constitute a portion of what was philosophically and rhetorically at issue between them. The identifiably different rhetorical behaviors of the two men were logically predictable to a considerable extent because they followed a kind of internal logic. An understanding of these leaders' assumptions about man and reason should help future researchers to assess more accurately each man's rhetorical-political potentialities in the Convention.

Notes

[1] For rhetorical analyses of the roles of Henry and Madison in the Convention, see Paul W. Batty, "An Examination and Evaluation of Selected Speeches of James Madison, Father of the Constitution and Fourth President of the United States," Thesis Northern Illinois University 1966; Wilbur Erwin Moore, "An Analysis and Criticism of James Madison as a Debater in the Virginia Federal Constitutional Convention," Thesis State University of Iowa 1932; Wilbur Erwin Moore, "James Madison, The Speaker," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 31 (1945), 155-162; Adelaide Ruth Snyder, "A Rhetorical Study of James Madison," Thesis Kent State University 1950; George R. Kneller, "Opposition to the Constitution: An Appraisal of Three Speeches of Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention of 1788," Thesis Bowling Green State University 1967; and Louis A. Mallory, "Patrick Henry," in A History and Criticism of American Public Address, ed. William N. Brigance, II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1943), pp. 580-602. Historical accounts include Hugh Blair Grigsby, The History of the Virginia Federal Convention of 1788, I (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1890); Freeman H. Hart, The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution 1763-1789 (Chapel Hill: The Univeristy of North Carolina Press, 1942); Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution 1781-1788 (Chapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1961); Forrest McDonald, "The Antifederalists,

1781-1789," The Wisconsin Magazine of History, 46 (1963), 206-214; Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution 1783-1789 (New York: Collier Books, 1971); Robert Allen Rutland, The Ordeal of the Constitution: The Antifederalists and the Ratification Struggle of 1787-1788 (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1965); Robert E. Thomas, "The Virginia Convention of 1788: A Criticism of Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution," Journal of Southern History, 19 (1953), 63-72; Carl Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal (New York: The Viking Press, 1948); and Alfred Young, The Debate Over the Constitution 1787-1789 (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965). Biographies of Henry that discuss his Convention speaking include William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry; Life, Correspondence, and Speeches, II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891); Robert Douthat Meade, Patrick Henry: Practical Revolutionary, II (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1969); Moses Coit Tyler, Patrick Henry (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1898); William Wirt, Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, and Haffelfinger, 1878); and Richard R. Beeman, Patrick Henry: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974). Discussion of Madison's contributions in the Convention can be found in Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution 1787-1800 (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950) and Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971).

[2] Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the

General Convention at Philadelphia, 2nd ed., III (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1881), p. 388. Elliot's work was the textual source for this study. He obtained his record of the Virginia Convention from the only account that was kept of its proceedings. That account was made by David Robertson, a shorthand reporter, and can be found in Robertson's Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia Convened at Richmond, on Monday the Second Day of June, 1788, for the Purpose of Deliberating on the Constitution Recommended by the Grand Federal Convention, 2nd ed. (Richmond: Enquirer Press, 1805). This author's examination of Robertson's record revealed that Elliot's work is a verbatim copy except for some minor printer's charges made to enhance readability. It was decided to use Elliot's work rather than Robertson's because the surviving copies of Robertson's record are rare and fragile.

[3] Elliot, p. 174.

[4] For a discussion of the influence of Samuel Davies on Henry, see Robert Douthat Meade, Patrick Henry: Patriot in the Making (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott C., 1957), pp. 61 and 70-73; Norine Dickson Campbell, Patrick Henry: Patriot and Statesman (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1969), pp. 2 and 17-18; and William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence, and Speeches, I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), pp. 15-16.

[5] Elliot, p. 137.

[6] Elliot, p. 54.

[7] Elliot, p. 167.

[8] The sample comes from Elliot, p. 21.

[9] Elliot, p. 45.

[10] Elliot, p. 147.

[11] Elliot, p. 149.

[12] Elliot, pp. 448-449. Italics added.

[13] By the time of the voting in Virginia (June 25, 1788), the Constitution was already in effect (New Hampshire being the ninth state to ratify on June 21). The delegates in Virginia did not learn of New Hampshire's ratification, however, until after the close of their Convention, but they did know of its likelihood. On June 19, 1788, the Virginia Gazette and Weekly Advertiser included in its dispatches from Philadelphia "an extract of a letter from a gentleman in New York to his friend in this city dated May 30" that read, "'New Hampshire is well disposed, and will have her Convention but a few days in session before the [sic] ratifies.'"

[14] Elliot, pp. 458-459.

[15] James Madison, "Federalist Paper Number Ten," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Roy P. Fairfield, 2nd ed. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 17.

[16] Neal Riemer, "James Madison's Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of Republican Government," Ethics, 65 (1954), 39.

[17] Elliot, p. 577.

[18] Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick contend that the Anti-federalists were, on the average, ten to twelve years older than the Federalists. See their article, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, 76 (1961), 181-216.

[19] Elliot, p. 159.

[20] Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: Univ. of

California Press, 1969), pp. 276 and 299.

[21] Elliot, p. 22.

[22] Elliot, p. 149.

[23] Elliot, p. 541.

[24] Elliot, p. 317.

[25] Elliot, p. 151.

[26] Elliot, p. 248.

[27] Elliot, pp. 86-87.

[28] Elliot, pp. 373-374.

[29] Batty, p. 76.

[30] Cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Antifederalists on the Nature of Representative Government," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 12 (1955), 3-43 and Cecelia Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966).

[31] Michael Kammen, People of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American Civilization (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

[32] Norman K. Risjord, "Virginians and the Constitution: A Multivariant Analysis," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 31 (1974), 627.

[33] For a discussion of other factors affecting voting behavior, see Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 324; Main, p. 233; and Risjord, p. 627.